Treu sottolinea che il modello di lavoro fordista, caratterizzato da occupazione stabile e contratti subordinati a tempo indeterminato, sta cedendo il passo a una maggiore diversità di forme di lavoro, tra cui contratti flessibili e lavoro atipico.
1. Labor law and economic efficiency
Labor law is only a part of the social and legal order and consequently it has a partial impact on the functioning of social and economic systems. However in the last years some aspects of traditional labor law, particularly the rigid protective legislation common to many European countries, has been accused of being an obstacle to innovation and investments, and consequently detrimental to economic efficiency and social dynamism.
This opinion has been widely shared, and has influenced in various ways not only the academic debate but also many policy makers, even though the evidence presented to support it is far from conclusive.
In fact convincing arguments have been advanced to show that the relationship between labor regulations and economic efficiency is a complex one. It depends on many variables: on the economic and institutional context of a given national system and specifically on the type and content of regulations. A similar argument has been recently accepted by quite a few international institutions (OECD, World Bank), contrary to earlier opinions which had denounced the negative effects of regulations.
The World bank has expressed a clear statement on this matter “employment regulations are unquestionably necessary”. But the impact of regulations can be negative when regulatory interventions are insufficient or excessive; so finding the right balance is essential.
In fact this statement needs quite a few specifications, because the influence of regulations depends not only on its quantity (more or less regulation), but also and predominantly on its quality, objects and purposes. Many critics directed to labor regulations are justified in so far as their traditional forms and contents which have been shaped in the last Century, are not adequate to cope with the new reality of the world of work.
In fact the need to revise the historical traits of labor law and of social policies, in order to meet the present social and economic challenges is widely recognized by expert and policy matters. But the direction of research is still uncertain and the proposed solutions are far from convergent.
Here I will analyze one particular aspect of this question, which goes to the very roots of our discipline: namely how the traditional types and techniques of employment regulations have reacted to the present social and economic transformations. My materials and examples will be drawn from the European experience, which I know best.
The European reactions to the economic crisis of the last decade and to the changing conditions of the world economy are particularly significant because the European Union has shaped a common social model characterized by high level of legal protection and by intensive employment regulation.
This legal model has been directly hit, even more than other areas of law, because the structural factors of transformation, digital technologies and global competition, have changed the very basis on which labor law was built in the last Century. In particular stable subordinate employment, which was the central object of labor law, has given way to a variety of non standard works. The fordist large companies which were the counterpart of an homogeneous working class are changing their structures. The national markets regulated by national legislation and collective bargaining are not any longer the only playing ground, because they have been extended far beyond the State borders.
2. Protective legislation and flexibility
A most important and controversial area has to do with the scope and content of protective labor legislation. The need to protect workers from arbitrary or unfair treatment is a major principle of our discipline. But, to quote again the World Bank, regulations must also “ensure efficient contracting between employers and workers”. More explicitly they have to meet the need of firms to operate efficiently, which in the present turbulent scenario, requires more flexibility than in the past. For this reason many national legislators have introduced and regulated various forms of flexibility (numerical, functional) aimed at facilitating the adaptation of work and business organization to the changing economic and social scenario.
Given this common trend, the specific solutions adopted are different. In particular flexibility may be introduced by sheer deregulation or by a selective regulation.
The former solution - sheer deregulation - has not been the rule in Europe. Regulations have been loosened in some areas in order to increase functional flexibility: eg. the employers has been recognized a wide discretion to introduce flexible worktime - and part time, or to change job assignements of their employees according to business needs.
Often the law has not directly reduced the limits to employers decisions,, but has delegated the regulation of these issues - of work time arrangement and job mobility - to collective agreements with employees representatives.
This form of regulation “delegated” to collective agreements has become common in many aspect of employment relations. The rationale of this choice is that statutory law may be necessary to fix some basic rules; but that it should better leave to collective (or individual) agreements the regulation of the changing aspect of work organization in the enterprise.
Moreover legislation should avoid fixing the details of employment conditions, because it cannot match the diversity and volatility of the present reality of work. Regulation by principles may be more appropriate, leaving room to judicial interpretation or to implementation according to actual business and work practices.
This combination of statutory law and collective regulation of flexibility may have a different impact on workers stability and welfare according to the factual context of employment relations (sectors, geographic areas, etc.).
3. Collective control of flexibility
A major variable in this respect is the capacity of collective agreements and of workers participation to control the employers use of flexibility.
The power of the Unions has been affected to a different degree by the economic and political context of the various States; indeed it has been reduced even in the countries, where it was traditionally entrenched.
Here too, however the reactions of industrial relations of the various European States are different and influenced by institutional factors, including legislation. In fact the law of some countries has continued to play a major role in the shaping industrial relations.
Particularly relevant to our problem are those legislations which support the activity of workers representatives in the enterprise, granting to these representatives not only bargaining functions but also the right to be consulted and even to control employers decisions concerning the organization of work (right of codetermination).
Here the law has not simply a function of regulation and limitation of private powers, but it aims at influencing the balance of power among the parties: for this reason it is called “promotional legislation”. A similar promotional purpose is pursued by those norms, common to some European legislation (e.g. France) which commit the parties, essentially the employers, to bargain with the workers representative both at national level and in the plants at fixed times on wages and major working conditions.
4. Flexibility and atypical employment contracts
The impact of flexibility varies also according to the objects of employment relations where the regulation is made more flexible.
The Unions of many countries and international organizations like the ILO have denounced the risk and the negative effects of numerical and external flexibility: in particular of the norms which have reduced the legal controls and the costs of dismissals, and which have introduced flexible types of employment contracts different from the subordinate employment for an indefinite period.
Economic research has produced evidence that this type of flexibility which operates at the “margin” of employment contracts and of labor markets may be detrimental not only to employees but also to productivity, because it may discourage investments in skills and hindering employer workers cooperation (World Bank).
The law cannot ignore that the forms of employment have greatly diversified from the standard type prevailing in the fordist economy. But neither it can limit itself to ratifying the variety of works which appear in the labor market
A major challenge to which labor lawyers and policy makers are confronted is how to diversify the forms and techniques of regulation according to the different types of works and to the needs of the employees.
This question is an object of academic research and of interventions by national legislators, by the courts and the social parties of various countries. Some European States (Spain, Germany, and also anglosaxon countries), have introduced alternative legal categories to regulate these new realities, such as para subordinate works, collaboration contracts, economically dependent employment. But the identification of the boundaries of these categories has proved controversial and the regulation of these legal entities have produced uneven results, often below the expectations of the policy makers.
For this reason the identification of work patterns and their regulation has been often delegated to the social parties; particularly in the grey areas of hybrid works which combine traits of subordination and of independence.
Sometime the issue has been decided by the Courts when called to adjudicate cases in areas not clearly regulated by law.
5. Selective regulation of new forms of work: the case of platform–based works
This new scenario has not only made uncertain the application of legal standards, but has contributed to break the traditional unity and compactness of protective legislation. The legislators and more often the Courts, faced with these forms of work of uncertain legal qualification, have applied to them not all the protections which compose the traditional core of labor law, but only some of them. They have abandoned, often tacitly, the traditional “all or nothing” approach.
These legal choices have followed so far a case by case approach. Only a general principle may be suggested in the selection of appropriate regulations. In my view the guiding rule should be to match the functions of the various labor and social security norms with the needs of protection and of promotion of the different types of work; and on the other hand with the necessity of safeguarding the competitiveness of the firms.
This general principle has to be tested on the ground as to suit the characters of each type of employment and to avoid both excessive rigidity of regulation and lack of workers protection. For this reason it seems premature to fix the principle into new or old legal categories.
The adoption of such a principle, as proposed in some countries, might favour a regulatory approach not only better finalized but also more flexible and simplified. It would reduce the number of norms of detail which is burdening many modern legal systems, and instead it would increase the importance of minimum standards, national and in perspective supranational.
In fact the selective approach to regulation has worked in two directions. Some traditional norms have been simplified, or made more flexible; others are loosing importance for employees who have acquired greater operational independence. Some basic standards of wages, working conditions and welfare benefits, have been extended to atypical and hybrid workers and even to independent professionals.
The digital revolution has further emplasized the need to revise the scope of traditional regulations in new directions. Most working patterns including the flexible forms adopted so far, will have to change; and equally widespread changes will be necessary in the personal skills required for the new jobs.
Some States have enacted specific regulations to protect workers privacy and business secrecy.
The techniques of regulation which are being used are often more procedural than substantive. E.g. some national norms oblige the employers to implement procedural rules, under the responsibility of plant managers, aimed at preventing any use of digital devices capable of violating employees privacy (violations are severely sanctioned).
The various forms of digital works which are emerging in the gig economy have posed new problems of categorization, because most of these employees often combine traits typical of both dependent and independent work. These problems have been so far mostly handled by national courts in hundreds of cases, which have received divergent solutions. In quite a few cases, mainly involving Uber drivers or the “riders”, the courts have considered them as employees, even when not all traditional indicators of subordination were present. Other courts have included them in the intermediate category mentioned above. Sometime the judges have recognized the hybrid character of their work in order to grant some but not all the protections of labor law. The need to recognize some basic protections to these workers has often prevailed over the uncertainty of the legal qualification of the contract.
6. Flexibility and security
The fluctuation of markets and the frequent changes in the organization of production have made increasingly difficult to guarantee to many workers the security of their jobs. In fact most legislations have renounced to maintain the legal limits existing in some countries to the power of employers to discharge their employees, particularly in case of economic downturn.
To compensate employees for the reduced security in their jobs various kinds of measures have been introduced. Most of them are directed to protect and assist displaced workers with monetary subsidies (unemployment benefits of different quantity and duration) and with a set of active policies (placement services, training and retraining) intended to facilitate their reentry into the labor market. This policy has implied to modify the traditional focus of protective legislation on the jobs by substituting it with protections on the labor market. The purpose of legislature is also different from the past, in so far as at aims at promoting continuity in employment rather than at ensuring specific job security.
This change of focus has been criticized because the effectiveness of the new measures to keep the balance between flexibility and security has been uneven, particularly when the economic crisis has increased the difficulty to assist the displaced workers for the time necessary for their reinstatement.
The balance has been better maintained in some countries (central - Northern Europe) well equipped with active labor policies and with strong welfare systems. Lacking these conditions, the balance has been precarious and the measures aimed at workers security have not protected them from the risks of unemployment.
The techniques adopted to promote these policies are also different, because normative provisions are not sufficient to pursue the objective. Efficient institutions and services must be organized and financed (either by contributions or by taxes) to provide the different forms of assistance and training needed to implement active labor policies and increase the security on the transnational markets of today.
On the other hands the focus of legal protection must be adapted and enlarged in order to protect workers from precariousness and from the new social and economic risks.
To this end the revision of labor law has been accompanied by the search of welfare measures conceived not as passive costs but as social investments. A more active set of policies is necessary both to reduce the increasing costs of social benefits and to mobilize the capacities of users, in order to promote their personal development and not simply to assist them in case of need.
An opportunity to be caught is to exploit the potentials of individuals, and even of individualism, by supporting personal trajectories in the various life cycles and by investing in the different qualities of people so as to shape their “capabilities”.
7. Regulation and promotion of collective action
The changes of the economic context and the diversification of work require a reappraisal not only of public employment policies but also of collective bargaining and industrial relations. How to do it is a controversial issue which has received different solutions also by those, governments and social parties, who consider collective bargaining and industrial relations an important form of social participation and of employees protection and not an obstacle to the functioning of the economy.
Collective agreements, have been shaped, like statutory law, according to the dominant patterns of standard employment and mostly based on the experience of the social parties of industrialized countries. If they are to remain a major source of regulation and promotion of employment, they too must revise their objectives and practices so as to respond to the diversification of employment patterns, and on the other hand to the globalization of markets.
Indeed these transformations are affecting the system Industrial Relations even more directly than the legal status of the contract of employment, in so far as industrial relations are exposed in many cases, without any protection, to the pressures of the markets, and because the diversification of work affects the very basis of collective action of the workers, more than the initiatives of the employers. The same factors have altered the power relations among the social parties to the detriment of the labor unions and account for the growing difficulties of traditional if which are visible even in the strongest system of Central and Northern Europe.
However here too the responses of the various national industrial relations are far from uniform as it is show by the main indicators.
The average union density, while in general declining, varies from the still high levels of the Scandinavian countries and Belgium, of the lowest of France and Spain. In countries like Italy it seems to have stabilized. Moreover the national variations of union density around the average have increased in all European States, which support a possible trend toward divergence or even polarization more than toward convergence.
Moreover the decline of overage union density and the even more market decline of industrial conflict (which has been largely confined to the public sector), are not fully reflected in the coverage and in the structure of collective bargaining. Here the variations among countries are different from those of Union density due to the impact of other factors, in particular of legislation and of public policies.
The coverage of national collective agreements has continued to be relatively high also in countries where the rate of unionization has been traditionally low such as France and Spain, and has further declined in recent years. This result is due mainly to State legislations which have supported the application of national and multi employer collective agreements beyond the area of unions influence by way of various mechanisms of legal extension. These legal interventions have been important in sustaining the regulatory role of collective agreements. Even though, according to the critics, they are far from sufficient to redress the balance of power which globalization and the crisis have made unfavourable for the unions.
Another significant example of promotional legislation has been adopted by some countries, and endorsed by an EU directive which grants consultation and participation rights to workers representatives on major enterprise decisions affecting working conditions. The experience of countries where this participation is widely adopted has shown positive results not only in facilitating employment relations, but also in improving both the welfare of workers and the productivity of firms. This approach however requires a major change of attitude in the culture and practice of the social parties, particularly of the unions most dedicated to conflict and often alien to participation.
An institutional support to participative IR comes also in this countries where unions and employers association have developed, with legal endorsement, a net of bilateral committees and organizations, which administer a considerable number of welfare provisions, and training instruments. These bilateral institutions have resisted to the economic crisis and to the change of government.
Quite a few national legislators have intervened in regulating the structure and the effects of collective bargaining. The pressure of markets and the need of flexibility have sustained a general trend forward the decentralization of bargaining structure. This trend has been endorsed by the law in some countries. Some recent regulations have explicity recognized the priority of company wide agreements for the regulation of most matters, over the once predominant national and multiemployer bargaining. Other national legislators (Italy, Germany) have recognized to decentralized agreements the same legal status as central agreements, leaving to the parties the power to regulate the distribution of roles and the relations between the different levels of bargaining.
The impact of this latter position has been different in the various countries. In some countries the labor unions, with (some) consensus of employers and of their associations, have been able to coordinate the two levels. Coordination has been pursued with the aim of balancing the power of national agreements to fix the general conditions of work for the various sectors of business, with the possibility of decentralized agreements to regulate specific aspects of the organization of work, including flexible work pattern and wages linked to productivity. Following these transformations the contents of both types of agreements have greatly changed from those prevailing in the past.
The national agreements have lost the traditional purpose of regulating the entire spectrum of the working conditions of the employees in the various sectors. Their normative contents has been reduced and limited to set some minimum standards. A greater part of the agreements has been occupied by defining general guidelines and objectives to be followed by decentralized agreements.
These guidelines are respected more or less closely depending on the capacity of the parties to guarantee an effective coordination between the two levels of bargaining. In countries like Germany and Italy the central labor unions have been able to control the process of decentralization, at least in the strong economic sectors and in medium large firms; and have used the possibility to derogate from the national standards in a limited number of occasions, mainly in cases of serious economic crisis in order to prevent mass dismissals and plant closures.
Decentralized agreements tend to become firm- specific, i.e. dedicated to solve specific problems of work organization and to administer the daily life of the workplace, through specialized procedures and bilateral committees. In many advanced companies participatory bargaining is competing with innovative HR management for the allegiance of the new and old types of employees.
8. Hard law and soft law
The difficulty of statutory law to master the variable characters of employment relations has spurred the search of new techniques and methods of regulation.
Various forms of new methods are being experimented under the general term of soft law. Soft law instruments have been widely used in international law because the traditional norms created by national institution ware considered unfit to regulate relations and issues going beyond the national borders.
Also the European legal system has been progressively created using different kinds of soft instruments. Even the Directives approved by the European institutions, which are the closest parallel to national legislations, are often not directly binding, but simply indicate more or less defined objectives to be pursued by member States.
In the area of employment relations the soft method of regulation most widely used in the European Union is the so called “open method of coordination” (OMC).
This choice has many reasons. The original purpose of the Union to harmonize by way of directive the national employment legislations proved to be impracticable because the member States, which maintain the major role in regulating employment matters under the treaties, have resisted to cede their prerogatives.
The different reactions of the national legal and social systems to the economic crisis and to the transformation of work have put further obstacles to the use of hard law for regulating employment problems. For the same reasons the integration of European Social policies has proved particularly difficult in traditionally controversial labor issues.
The open method of coordination, which was first experimented in some areas of labor relations, has become a general instrument of regulation not only of employment problems but also of other social and even economic areas. The application of the OMC rests on soft law mechanisms such as guidelines, indicators for benchmarking techniques and sharing of best practices.
The structure and contents of these mechanism combine different elements. The imperative characters of legal regulations are obscured by the non binding effects of the guidelines and the fact that they are implemented only by “peer review”. Moreover the indicators and guidelines to be adopted are identified by a process of comparative analysis of practices and by an exchange of informations supported by the participation of different groups of stakeholders.
This process emphasizes the cognitive and reflexive aspects of the OMC.
It indicates that its effectiveness rests on the persuasive capacity of the exchange of informations and of the adoption of common indicators, even more than on the procedures of monitoring and of enforcement of the guidelines.
In spite of many years of experience the evaluation of the open method of coordination is still controversial. This method has been useful to stimulate virtuos examples of mutual learning and of exchange of good practices. Its pragmatic and reflexive approach has facilitated policy transfers in controversial matters where harmonization by way of directive has proved impracticable. More in general it has promoted the need to combine normative solutions with practical policy making.
On the other hand the enforcement mechanisms which are limited to system of peer reviews have proved weak. Consequently the MAC has hardly been effective in promoting actual convergence of practices and regulations toward the objectives fixed by the guidelines. Various proposals have been advanced to strengthen the procedures of enforcement with sanctions or more realistically with incentives. But these proposals have not been accepted sofar.
9. Multiple instruments for international social regulation
Globalization and the growing importance of global trade have posed new challenges to the capacity of legal instruments to regulate employment relations. Our legal and even political categories which have been built for a national dimension, need to be refraimed in order to fit a totally different scale. More political and intellectual investments are necessary to adapt these categories to the total scenario.
Part of the challenge is that the law is called to reconcile the commercial logic of trade with the need to protect basic social rights of individuals and of the groups of workers affected by international trade.
The confrontation of the commercial logic of trade with social rights has been historically exorcised, as it is shown by the separation between the spheres of competence of the ILO and of the WTO.
The complexity of the issues involved and the variety of the actors involved in international trade has given rise to a diversification of forms of regulation: directive and recommendations of international organizations (ILO, OECD in the first place); social clauses inserted in international treaties; general systems of preference (GSP); codes of practices of multinational enterprises; transnational collective agreements.
The difference of these sources and of the matters affected has brought about an extreme variety of contents and techniques of regulation, plus different systems of implementation. The whole spectrum of regulatory systems developed in national and international experiences has found here a fertile ground of application.
This variety of rules reflects different principles and motivations. The original motivation is strictly economic and follows the principle whereby fair trade does not allow comparative advantages based on the reduction of social standards, which are considered to distort competition.
But other wider motivations have been advanced, particularly by the ILO; which assigns to these rules the purpose not only to regulate competition but to promote also in international trade the respect of basic social standards and the principles of decent work.
This approach has influenced the contents of commercial agreements to a different extent, often in a minor part. And it has been particularly difficult to be implemented on practice.
The ultradecennial experience of social clauses present a great variety of contents, as is witnessed by the difference in the language of the clauses, in the type of commitments assumed by the parties and in the enforcement mechanisms. The commitments vary from a general respect of the basic rights to the observance of the core labor standards of the ILO.
Recent agreements, particularly the CETA and TPP, have adopted a language more assertive than in the past, in the definition of the commitments of the parties and have established better procedures to monitor their implementation, to solve the disputes and more precise the sanctions for the violations of the social obligations.
Another vector of globalization of regulations is represented by the codes of conducts and by the rules adopted by Multinational Enterprises to organize their activities in different countries.
These rules are of private nature and usually contain guidelines more than strict regulations. This approach allows for great flexibility and variety of contents, only in part related to labor issues. But in general their effectiveness rests on the capacity and on the will of the companies to guarantee their implementation.
The Multinational enterprises can exert wide discretion in these regulations for two reasons: for the weak presence of trade unions in international relations, and for the reduced capacity of the national States to influence the decisions of these enterprise.
Even so some agreements, more or less formalized, have been signed by large multinational companies with the unions present in their plants and more often with the works councils.
The agreements concluded by these firms have acquired greater diffusion also due to the trend to decentralize industrial relations which is common to many countries. The transnational company agreements can have more direct effects than sectional agreements because they can be implemented directly, also transnationally, by the decision of the companies which are party to the agreement.
The contents of transnational agreements are quite variable; they may fix only some obligations between the negotiating parties or may also regulate some aspects of the individual employment relations. The agreements concluded by European multinationals often confirm the ILO basic labor standards and also fix more favorable employment and social conditions.
When these agreements have binding regulations and not merely programmatic statements, the problem arises of defining their legal effects both within the national borders and in countries different from that of the bargaining parties.
This question has received hardly any legal test, because the parties tend to solve their disputes under the agreements through their own channels without resorting to national tribunals; moreover the national courts have been quite reluctant to decide labor cases arising and or developed in other countries, i.e. to admit an extraterritorial application of national labor legislations.
The regulatory instruments mentioned here – social clauses, GSP, codes of conduct, TCA - testimony an increasing commitment of the various actors, national and international, to introduce at least some basic social principles in international trade. But these instruments are scarcely effective in many respects: not only for the limits of the commitments, but for the weakness of the enforcement procedures. These limits mostly depend on the actors of the transnational rules which are different from those of the national regulations. In fact their common character of is that they are not sustained by the authority of State institutions and apparatus which have supported for centuries the binding effects of the law.
The actors involved here are at least three: the international organizations, the national States, and the Multinationals. The former institutions have no direct legislative powers; and their enforcement mechanisms are largely dependent on national States and on social parties which are both reluctant to delegate to them more binding powers.
The national States are still important actors, even though threatened by globalization. But so far they have not invested enough in supporting the implementation of supranational rules, particularly in employment and social matters. Moreover the major role in the preparation and implementation of these rules is played by State burocracies and by technical agencies hardly controlled by democratic institutions of the countries.
The multinational enterprises have acquired a major importance in international affairs and their influence is far greater than that exerted by the (weak) international projections of social parties, labor unions in particular.
Moreover the regulation of social and employment relations is not the primary objective of these companies and is largely independent from public influence.
Improving the quality and the effectiveness of transnational social regulations is not a merely technical task. It would require a change in the strategy of the various actors. The Multinational enterprises should accept more stringent social obligations than those resulting from the codes of practice. The States could require the enterprises to abide by the same social standards included in the trade agreements and or to give binding force to the principles of corporate social responsibility.
But most important they should give priority in their political agenda to supporting the presence and the influence of social rules in international relations.
The same strategy should be adopted of the social parties and by civic organizations which are required to project their actions beyond the national markets where they have been tested in the past.
The weak powers of the international organizations in our field need to be supported by the subsidiary intervention of organized groups of interest.
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