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Diritto del lavoro e globalizzazione

ILERA WORLD CONGRESS THE FUTURE OF WORK

ILERA WORLD CONGRESS THE FUTURE OF WORK

Treu sottolinea che il modello di lavoro fordista, caratterizzato da occupazione stabile e contratti subordinati a tempo indeterminato, sta cedendo il passo a una maggiore diversità di forme di lavoro, tra cui contratti flessibili e lavoro atipico.

1. Labor law and economic  efficiency 

Labor law is  only a part of the social and legal order and consequently it has  a partial impact on the functioning of social and economic systems. However in the last years  some aspects of traditional labor law,  particularly  the rigid  protective legislation common to many  European  countries,  has been   accused of  being an obstacle  to innovation  and investments,  and consequently detrimental  to economic  efficiency  and social  dynamism.

This opinion  has  been  widely shared,  and has influenced   in various ways not only the academic debate but also many policy makers, even though the evidence  presented to support it is  far from  conclusive. 

In fact   convincing  arguments have been advanced to  show that the  relationship between labor regulations and economic efficiency is a complex  one. It depends  on many  variables:   on the economic  and institutional context of a given  national system and specifically  on the type  and  content of  regulations. A similar  argument  has been recently accepted   by  quite  a few international  institutions (OECD, World Bank), contrary  to  earlier opinions which had denounced the negative effects of regulations.

The World bank  has  expressed a clear statement on  this matter “employment regulations are unquestionably necessary”. But the impact of regulations  can be negative  when regulatory  interventions  are  insufficient  or excessive;  so finding  the right balance  is essential.

In fact this  statement  needs  quite  a few specifications,  because  the  influence of regulations depends not  only on its quantity (more or less regulation), but  also  and predominantly on its quality, objects and  purposes. Many  critics  directed  to  labor  regulations  are justified  in so far  as  their  traditional  forms  and contents which have been  shaped  in the last  Century, are not adequate   to cope with the new reality of the world of work. 

In fact the need to revise  the historical traits of labor law  and of social  policies,    in order to  meet the present  social and economic challenges is widely  recognized  by expert  and policy matters. But the direction  of research  is still uncertain and the proposed  solutions are  far from  convergent.

Here I will analyze one  particular  aspect  of this question,  which goes to the very roots of our  discipline:  namely how the traditional types  and techniques  of employment  regulations  have reacted to the present   social and economic transformations. My materials and examples will  be drawn from the  European experience, which I know best.  

The European reactions  to the  economic crisis  of the last decade  and to the  changing  conditions  of  the world economy  are particularly significant  because  the European Union  has shaped  a common social model characterized  by high  level of legal protection  and by  intensive employment regulation.

This legal model has been directly hit, even  more than other areas of law, because the structural factors of transformation, digital technologies  and global competition,  have changed  the very basis  on which  labor law was built  in the last Century. In particular stable subordinate  employment,  which  was  the central  object of labor law,  has given  way  to a variety  of non standard works. The fordist large companies which  were  the counterpart of an homogeneous  working class  are changing  their  structures. The national markets regulated  by national  legislation and  collective  bargaining  are not  any   longer the only playing  ground,  because they have  been  extended far beyond  the State borders. 


2. Protective legislation  and flexibility 

A most important  and controversial  area has to do  with  the scope  and content  of protective  labor  legislation. The need  to  protect  workers  from arbitrary  or unfair  treatment  is  a major principle  of our  discipline. But, to quote  again  the World Bank, regulations  must  also “ensure efficient contracting  between employers and workers”. More explicitly  they  have  to meet  the need of firms  to operate   efficiently, which  in the  present turbulent scenario, requires  more flexibility than in the past.  For this reason many national legislators have  introduced and regulated  various  forms of flexibility (numerical, functional) aimed at facilitating  the adaptation of work  and business  organization  to the  changing economic and  social scenario. 

Given this common  trend,  the  specific solutions  adopted  are different.  In particular flexibility  may  be introduced  by sheer  deregulation or by  a  selective  regulation.

The former solution  - sheer deregulation - has not been  the rule  in Europe. Regulations  have been  loosened  in some areas in order  to increase  functional flexibility: eg.  the employers has been  recognized  a wide  discretion  to introduce  flexible worktime - and part time,  or to change job  assignements of  their  employees  according  to business needs.

Often  the law has  not directly reduced  the limits to employers  decisions,,  but has delegated   the regulation of these issues  - of work time  arrangement and job mobility - to  collective  agreements with  employees representatives.

This form  of regulation “delegated”  to collective agreements has become  common in  many  aspect of employment  relations. The rationale of this choice is that statutory  law may be necessary  to fix some basic  rules;  but  that it should  better  leave to collective  (or individual) agreements the regulation  of the changing aspect of work organization in the enterprise. 

Moreover legislation should avoid fixing  the details of employment  conditions,  because   it  cannot  match  the diversity  and volatility  of the present reality  of work. Regulation by  principles  may be more  appropriate, leaving  room to judicial  interpretation  or to implementation   according   to actual   business and work  practices.  

This combination of statutory law  and collective  regulation  of flexibility  may have a different  impact on workers  stability  and welfare  according  to the  factual context  of  employment  relations (sectors,  geographic areas, etc.).


3. Collective  control of flexibility 

A major  variable in this respect  is the  capacity  of collective  agreements and of workers  participation  to control  the  employers use of flexibility. 

The power  of the Unions has been affected to a different degree by the economic and political context of the various States; indeed it has  been reduced even in the countries, where it was traditionally entrenched.

Here too, however  the reactions  of  industrial relations  of the various  European  States are different  and influenced  by institutional  factors,  including  legislation. In fact  the law of  some countries has   continued  to play   a major role  in the shaping  industrial  relations.

Particularly  relevant to our  problem  are those  legislations which  support   the activity  of workers  representatives in the enterprise,  granting  to these  representatives  not only  bargaining functions  but also  the right to be consulted  and even  to control employers  decisions  concerning  the organization of work (right of codetermination).

Here the law has  not simply  a function  of regulation and limitation of private  powers, but it aims  at  influencing the balance  of power  among  the parties:  for this reason it is called “promotional legislation”. A similar  promotional  purpose  is  pursued  by those norms,  common  to some  European  legislation (e.g. France)  which commit the parties,  essentially  the employers,  to bargain with the workers  representative  both  at national level  and  in the plants  at fixed  times on wages and major working conditions.  


4.  Flexibility  and atypical  employment  contracts

The impact  of flexibility varies  also according  to the objects  of employment  relations where  the regulation is made  more flexible.

The Unions  of many countries  and international  organizations like the ILO  have  denounced  the risk  and the negative  effects of  numerical and external flexibility: in particular of the  norms which have reduced  the legal  controls  and the costs  of dismissals, and  which  have introduced flexible  types of employment  contracts different  from  the  subordinate  employment for an indefinite period.

Economic research  has produced  evidence that this type of  flexibility which  operates  at the “margin” of employment contracts and  of labor markets  may be detrimental not only to employees but also to productivity, because it may discourage investments in skills and hindering  employer  workers  cooperation (World Bank). 

The law cannot  ignore  that the forms  of employment have greatly diversified from  the standard type prevailing  in the fordist economy.  But neither it can limit  itself to ratifying  the variety  of works which appear  in the labor  market

A major  challenge to which  labor lawyers and policy makers  are confronted is how to diversify the forms and techniques  of regulation  according to the different  types  of works  and to the needs of  the employees. 

This question  is an object of academic research  and  of  interventions by national  legislators, by the courts and the social  parties of  various  countries. Some  European  States (Spain, Germany, and also  anglosaxon  countries),  have introduced  alternative legal  categories  to regulate  these new realities,  such  as  para subordinate works, collaboration  contracts, economically  dependent  employment. But the identification  of the boundaries  of these categories  has  proved controversial  and  the regulation of these  legal  entities have  produced  uneven  results, often  below  the expectations  of the policy  makers. 

For this reason the identification  of work  patterns and their regulation  has been  often delegated  to the social  parties; particularly in the grey  areas of  hybrid works which  combine traits  of subordination and of independence. 

Sometime the issue  has been  decided  by the Courts when  called  to adjudicate cases in  areas not clearly regulated by law.


5. Selective regulation of new forms  of work: the case of platform–based works

This new scenario has  not only  made uncertain  the application  of legal  standards,  but has contributed  to break the traditional  unity  and compactness of protective  legislation. The legislators  and more  often the Courts, faced with these  forms of work of uncertain legal qualification, have  applied to them not  all the protections which  compose the traditional  core of labor law, but only some of them. They have abandoned, often tacitly,  the traditional “all or nothing” approach.

These legal choices  have followed so far a case by case  approach. Only a general  principle  may  be suggested in the  selection  of appropriate  regulations. In my view the guiding rule should be to match  the functions  of the various labor and social security  norms with  the needs of protection and of promotion  of the different types of work; and on the other hand with the  necessity  of safeguarding  the competitiveness of the firms.

This general  principle has to be  tested  on the ground as to  suit  the characters of each type  of employment  and to avoid both  excessive  rigidity  of regulation and  lack of workers protection. For this reason it seems premature to fix the principle  into new or old legal categories.

The adoption of such  a principle, as proposed in some  countries, might favour      a regulatory  approach not only  better  finalized  but also  more flexible  and simplified. It  would reduce  the number  of norms  of detail  which  is burdening  many modern legal systems,  and instead it would increase the importance  of minimum standards, national and in perspective supranational. 

In fact  the selective  approach  to regulation has worked  in two directions. Some traditional norms  have been  simplified,  or made more flexible; others   are loosing  importance for employees who  have acquired  greater  operational  independence. Some  basic  standards of wages,  working   conditions and welfare benefits, have been  extended  to atypical  and hybrid workers and even to independent professionals.

The digital  revolution has further emplasized  the need  to revise the scope of traditional regulations in new directions. Most working  patterns including the flexible forms adopted so far, will have to change; and equally widespread changes  will be necessary in the personal skills required for the new jobs.

Some States  have enacted  specific  regulations to protect workers privacy  and business secrecy. 

The techniques  of regulation which are being used are often  more procedural  than  substantive. E.g. some national  norms oblige  the employers to implement procedural rules, under the responsibility of plant managers, aimed at preventing any use of digital devices capable of violating employees privacy (violations are severely sanctioned). 

The various forms of digital works which are emerging in the gig economy have posed new problems of categorization, because most of these employees often combine  traits typical of both dependent and independent work. These problems have been so far mostly handled by  national courts in hundreds of cases, which have received  divergent solutions. In quite a few cases, mainly involving Uber drivers or the “riders”, the courts have considered them as  employees, even when not all traditional indicators of subordination were present. Other courts have included them in the intermediate category mentioned above. Sometime the judges  have  recognized the hybrid character of their work in order to grant some but not all the protections of labor law. The need to recognize  some basic protections to these workers has often prevailed over the uncertainty of the legal qualification of the contract.


6. Flexibility and security 

The fluctuation of markets  and the frequent  changes  in the organization  of production  have made  increasingly  difficult  to guarantee to many workers  the security  of their jobs. In fact most legislations  have  renounced  to maintain  the legal limits existing in some  countries to the power of employers to discharge their employees, particularly  in case  of economic  downturn. 

To compensate  employees for the reduced  security in their jobs  various kinds of measures  have been  introduced. Most of them are  directed  to protect and assist  displaced  workers with  monetary subsidies (unemployment benefits of different quantity and duration) and  with  a  set of active  policies  (placement services, training and retraining) intended to facilitate their  reentry into the  labor market. This  policy  has implied to modify the traditional  focus of protective  legislation on the jobs by substituting it with  protections on the labor market. The purpose of legislature is  also different  from  the past, in so far as at aims at promoting continuity  in employment  rather than at ensuring specific job security.

This change  of focus has been  criticized  because  the effectiveness  of the new measures  to keep  the balance  between flexibility  and security  has been uneven, particularly when  the economic crisis  has  increased  the difficulty to assist the displaced  workers for the  time necessary for their reinstatement.

The balance has been better maintained in some countries (central - Northern Europe) well equipped with active labor policies and with strong welfare systems. Lacking these conditions, the balance has been precarious and the measures aimed at workers security have not protected them from the risks of unemployment. 

The techniques adopted to promote  these policies are also  different,  because  normative provisions  are not sufficient to pursue the objective. Efficient  institutions  and services must be  organized and financed  (either by contributions or by  taxes)  to provide  the different  forms of assistance and training  needed  to implement  active labor policies and increase  the security on the transnational  markets of today.

On the other hands the focus  of legal  protection  must be  adapted  and enlarged  in order  to protect workers from precariousness  and from the new social and economic risks.

To this  end the revision of labor law  has been accompanied by the search of welfare measures conceived not as passive costs but as social  investments. A more active set of policies is necessary both to reduce the increasing costs of social benefits and   to mobilize the capacities of users, in order to promote their personal development and not simply to assist them in case of need. 

An opportunity to be caught  is to exploit the potentials of individuals, and even of individualism, by supporting personal trajectories in the various  life cycles and by investing in the different qualities  of people so as to shape their “capabilities”.                                                                                                      


7. Regulation and promotion of collective action 

The changes of the economic context  and the diversification of work require a reappraisal not only of public  employment policies but also of collective bargaining and industrial relations. How to do it is a controversial  issue which has received  different solutions  also by those, governments and social parties, who consider collective bargaining  and industrial relations  an important form of social  participation  and of employees protection and not an obstacle to the functioning  of the economy.

Collective  agreements, have  been  shaped, like statutory  law,  according  to the  dominant patterns of     standard  employment   and mostly based  on the  experience  of the social  parties of  industrialized countries. If they are  to remain a major  source of regulation  and promotion  of employment, they too  must revise their objectives and practices so as  to respond to the diversification of employment patterns, and on the other hand to  the  globalization  of  markets. 

Indeed    these transformations  are  affecting the system  Industrial Relations even more  directly than  the legal  status of the contract of employment, in so far  as  industrial relations are exposed in many cases, without any  protection, to the pressures  of the  markets,  and because  the diversification  of work  affects the very  basis   of collective  action of the workers,  more than  the initiatives of the employers. The same factors  have altered  the power  relations among the  social parties  to the detriment  of the  labor  unions  and account for  the  growing  difficulties  of traditional  if which are  visible  even in the  strongest  system of  Central and Northern Europe.

However  here too the responses  of the  various  national  industrial  relations are far from  uniform as it is show by the main  indicators.

The average  union density, while in general declining, varies  from  the still high levels of the Scandinavian  countries  and Belgium, of the  lowest of France  and Spain. In countries like Italy it seems to have  stabilized. Moreover  the national  variations of union density  around the average  have increased in all European States, which support a possible  trend toward divergence or even polarization more than toward convergence. 

Moreover  the decline of overage  union density  and the  even more  market decline of  industrial conflict (which has been largely confined to the public sector), are not fully reflected in the coverage and in the structure of collective bargaining. Here the variations among countries are  different from those of Union density due to the impact of other factors, in particular of  legislation and of public policies.

The coverage of national collective agreements has continued  to be relatively high  also in countries where the rate of unionization has been traditionally low  such as France and Spain, and has further declined in recent years. This result is due mainly to State  legislations which  have supported the application of national and multi employer  collective agreements beyond the  area of unions influence by way of various mechanisms of  legal extension. These legal  interventions have been  important  in sustaining  the regulatory  role  of collective  agreements. Even though, according to the critics, they are far from sufficient to redress  the balance  of power  which  globalization  and the crisis have made  unfavourable for the  unions. 

Another  significant  example  of promotional  legislation  has been adopted  by some countries, and endorsed by an EU  directive which  grants consultation and participation  rights to workers  representatives on major  enterprise decisions affecting working conditions. The experience  of countries where this participation is widely adopted has shown positive results not only in facilitating employment relations, but also in improving both  the welfare of workers  and the productivity of firms. This approach however requires a major change of attitude in the culture and practice of the social parties, particularly of the unions most dedicated to conflict and often alien to participation. 

An institutional support  to participative IR comes also in this  countries  where unions and employers association  have developed, with  legal endorsement, a net of bilateral committees and organizations, which  administer a considerable  number of welfare  provisions, and training  instruments. These  bilateral  institutions have  resisted  to the economic  crisis and to  the change of government. 

Quite a few national  legislators have intervened  in regulating the  structure  and the effects  of collective  bargaining. The pressure of  markets  and the need  of  flexibility  have  sustained  a general  trend forward  the decentralization  of bargaining  structure. This  trend has been  endorsed  by the law in some countries. Some   recent regulations  have  explicity  recognized  the priority  of company wide agreements for the regulation  of most  matters, over  the once  predominant national and  multiemployer bargaining. Other  national legislators  (Italy, Germany) have recognized to decentralized  agreements the same  legal status as central  agreements, leaving  to the parties  the power to  regulate  the distribution  of roles  and the  relations  between  the different  levels  of bargaining.

The  impact  of this  latter position has been  different in the various  countries. In some countries the  labor  unions, with (some)  consensus  of employers  and of their associations,  have  been  able to  coordinate the two levels. Coordination  has been pursued  with the  aim of balancing the power of  national  agreements  to fix the general conditions  of work  for the  various sectors  of business, with  the possibility  of decentralized  agreements to regulate  specific  aspects of the  organization of work, including flexible  work  pattern and  wages  linked to productivity. Following  these transformations the contents  of both  types  of agreements have  greatly  changed  from  those  prevailing in the past. 

The national  agreements have lost  the traditional  purpose of   regulating  the entire spectrum  of the working  conditions of the employees in the various  sectors. Their  normative  contents  has been  reduced  and limited  to set  some  minimum  standards. A  greater part of the agreements has been  occupied  by defining   general  guidelines  and objectives  to be followed by decentralized agreements.

These guidelines  are  respected more  or less  closely  depending  on the  capacity of the parties to guarantee an effective coordination  between  the two  levels  of bargaining.  In countries  like  Germany and Italy the central labor unions have been able  to control the process of decentralization, at least in the strong economic sectors and in medium  large firms; and have used the  possibility to derogate from the national standards in a limited  number of occasions, mainly in cases of serious economic crisis in order  to prevent mass dismissals and plant closures.

Decentralized  agreements tend to become  firm- specific, i.e.  dedicated  to  solve  specific  problems  of work organization  and to administer the daily life  of the workplace,  through  specialized  procedures and  bilateral   committees. In many  advanced  companies  participatory bargaining is  competing  with  innovative HR management  for  the  allegiance of the new  and old  types  of employees. 


8. Hard law and soft law

The difficulty  of statutory  law to master  the variable  characters of  employment relations  has  spurred  the search  of  new  techniques  and methods of regulation.

Various  forms of new  methods are being  experimented  under  the general  term  of soft law. Soft law  instruments have been  widely  used  in international  law because the traditional norms created by national  institution ware considered unfit to regulate relations  and issues  going  beyond  the national  borders.

Also the European  legal  system has been  progressively  created  using  different  kinds  of soft instruments. Even  the Directives  approved by the  European  institutions,  which are the closest  parallel  to national  legislations, are often not directly  binding,  but simply   indicate  more or less  defined  objectives to be  pursued by member States.

In the area  of employment  relations the soft method of regulation  most widely  used in the European  Union  is the so called “open method of coordination” (OMC).

 This choice  has  many reasons. The original  purpose of the Union  to harmonize by way of directive  the national employment legislations  proved  to be  impracticable  because  the member States,  which maintain the major  role in regulating  employment  matters under the treaties, have  resisted to cede  their  prerogatives.

 The different  reactions  of the national  legal and social systems  to the economic  crisis  and  to the transformation  of work  have  put further obstacles  to the  use of  hard law for regulating  employment problems. For the same reasons  the integration  of European  Social policies has proved  particularly  difficult  in traditionally  controversial labor issues.

The open method of coordination, which was  first  experimented  in some areas of  labor  relations, has  become  a general  instrument of regulation  not only  of employment  problems but also  of other social  and even  economic areas.   The application  of the OMC rests on  soft law  mechanisms  such   as guidelines, indicators for  benchmarking techniques and sharing of best practices.

The structure  and contents of these mechanism  combine  different elements. The imperative  characters of legal regulations are obscured  by  the non binding effects of the   guidelines  and the fact that they are implemented only by “peer review”. Moreover  the indicators and guidelines  to be adopted are identified  by a process  of comparative analysis of practices and by an exchange of informations supported by the participation of different groups of stakeholders.

 This process  emphasizes   the cognitive  and reflexive aspects of the  OMC.

 It indicates that  its effectiveness  rests on the persuasive  capacity  of the  exchange  of  informations  and of the  adoption  of common  indicators,  even  more than  on the  procedures of monitoring  and of enforcement of the guidelines. 

In spite of many years of experience  the evaluation  of the open  method of coordination is still controversial. This method has  been  useful  to stimulate  virtuos examples  of mutual  learning  and of exchange of good practices. Its pragmatic  and reflexive  approach has facilitated  policy transfers in controversial  matters where  harmonization by way of directive  has  proved  impracticable. More in general  it has promoted the need  to combine  normative solutions with   practical policy  making.

On the other hand  the enforcement  mechanisms which are limited  to system of  peer  reviews have  proved  weak. Consequently the MAC has hardly been  effective  in promoting  actual convergence of practices and regulations  toward the objectives fixed by the guidelines. Various proposals have been advanced to strengthen  the procedures of enforcement  with  sanctions or more  realistically with  incentives. But these  proposals have not been accepted sofar.


9. Multiple instruments for international social regulation

Globalization  and the  growing  importance of global trade have   posed  new challenges   to the capacity  of  legal instruments to regulate  employment relations. Our legal   and even political categories  which have  been built for a national  dimension,  need to  be refraimed in order to fit a totally different scale. More  political  and intellectual  investments are necessary to adapt  these categories  to the total  scenario.

 Part of  the challenge is that   the law is called  to reconcile  the commercial  logic  of trade  with  the need  to protect  basic social  rights of individuals and of the groups of workers  affected by  international trade.  

The confrontation of the commercial logic of trade with social rights has been historically exorcised, as it is shown by the separation between the spheres of competence of the ILO and of the WTO.

The complexity  of the issues  involved  and the  variety  of the actors  involved in  international  trade has  given  rise to a diversification  of forms  of regulation: directive  and  recommendations of  international  organizations  (ILO, OECD in the first place);  social clauses  inserted  in international  treaties; general systems of preference  (GSP); codes  of practices of multinational  enterprises; transnational  collective  agreements. 

The difference  of these sources  and  of the  matters affected  has brought  about an extreme  variety  of contents  and techniques  of regulation, plus  different  systems of implementation. The whole  spectrum  of regulatory  systems developed  in  national and international  experiences has found here a fertile  ground of application. 

This variety of rules  reflects different principles and  motivations. The original motivation is strictly economic  and follows the principle whereby fair trade  does not allow comparative advantages based on the reduction of  social standards, which are considered  to distort competition.

But other  wider motivations  have  been  advanced, particularly  by the ILO; which assigns to these rules the purpose  not only  to regulate  competition but to promote  also in international  trade the respect of basic  social standards and the principles  of decent work. 

This approach  has influenced  the contents of commercial  agreements to a different extent, often in a minor  part. And it has  been  particularly  difficult  to be implemented on practice.

The ultradecennial experience  of social clauses  present a great  variety  of contents, as is  witnessed by the difference in the language  of the clauses, in the type of commitments assumed by the parties  and in the enforcement   mechanisms. The commitments vary  from  a general respect of the basic  rights to the  observance of the  core labor standards  of the ILO. 

Recent agreements, particularly the CETA and TPP, have adopted a language more assertive than in the past,  in the definition of the commitments of the parties and have established better procedures to monitor their implementation, to solve the disputes and more precise the sanctions for the violations of the social obligations.

Another  vector  of globalization  of regulations is represented by  the  codes of conducts  and by  the rules adopted  by Multinational Enterprises  to organize their  activities  in different countries. 

These rules are  of private  nature and usually   contain  guidelines  more than strict regulations. This approach allows for great  flexibility  and variety  of contents, only in part  related  to labor  issues. But in general their  effectiveness  rests on the capacity   and on the will  of  the companies  to guarantee  their implementation.

The Multinational enterprises can exert wide discretion in these regulations for two reasons: for  the weak presence of trade unions in international relations, and for the reduced capacity of the national States to influence  the decisions of these  enterprise.

Even so some  agreements,  more or less formalized, have been signed by large multinational companies with the unions present in their plants and more often with the works councils.

The agreements concluded by these firms have acquired greater diffusion also due to the trend to decentralize industrial relations which is common to many countries. The transnational  company agreements  can have more direct effects  than sectional agreements because they can be implemented directly, also transnationally, by the decision of the companies which are party to the agreement. 

The contents of transnational agreements are quite variable; they may  fix  only some obligations between the negotiating parties or may  also regulate some aspects  of the individual employment relations. The agreements concluded by European multinationals often confirm the ILO basic labor standards and also fix more favorable employment and social conditions.

When these agreements have binding regulations and not merely programmatic statements, the problem arises  of  defining their legal effects both within the national borders and in countries different from that of the bargaining parties.

This question has received hardly any legal test, because the parties tend to solve their disputes under the agreements through their own channels without resorting to national tribunals; moreover the national courts have been quite reluctant to decide labor cases arising and or developed in other countries, i.e. to admit an extraterritorial application of national labor legislations.

The regulatory  instruments mentioned  here – social  clauses, GSP, codes of conduct, TCA -  testimony  an increasing  commitment  of  the various  actors, national  and international,  to introduce  at least  some basic  social  principles  in international trade.  But these instruments are scarcely  effective in many  respects:  not only for the limits  of the commitments, but  for the weakness of  the enforcement procedures. These limits mostly depend  on the actors of  the  transnational rules  which  are different  from those  of the national  regulations. In fact  their  common  character of  is that  they  are not sustained  by the authority  of  State institutions and  apparatus which  have supported  for centuries  the binding effects of the law. 

The actors  involved here are  at least three: the international organizations, the national States, and the Multinationals. The former  institutions  have  no direct  legislative  powers;  and their enforcement  mechanisms are largely dependent on  national States  and on social  parties which  are  both reluctant to delegate to them  more binding  powers.

The national States are  still important actors,  even though  threatened  by globalization. But so far they  have  not  invested enough in  supporting  the  implementation  of  supranational rules, particularly  in employment and  social matters. Moreover  the  major role  in the  preparation  and implementation  of these  rules  is played  by State  burocracies  and by technical  agencies hardly controlled  by democratic  institutions of the  countries. 

The multinational enterprises  have  acquired  a major  importance  in international  affairs and their influence is far greater than that exerted by the (weak) international projections of social parties, labor unions in particular. 

Moreover  the regulation  of social and employment relations  is not  the  primary  objective of these companies  and is largely  independent  from public  influence.

Improving  the quality and the effectiveness  of  transnational  social  regulations is not a merely  technical  task. It  would require a change  in the strategy of the various actors. The Multinational enterprises should accept more stringent social obligations than those resulting from the codes of practice. The States could require the enterprises to abide by the same social standards included in the trade agreements and or to give binding force to the principles of corporate social responsibility.

But most important  they should  give priority  in their political agenda to supporting the  presence  and the influence of social rules in international  relations.

The same strategy  should be adopted of the social parties and by civic organizations which are required to project their actions beyond the national markets where they have been tested in the past. 

The weak powers of the international organizations in our field need to be supported by the subsidiary intervention of organized groups of interest.












 


















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